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Antebellum Commercial Law:
Common Law Approaches
to Secured Transactions
By TONY FREYER*
Scholars have long argued that legal rules favoring the secur-
ity and transfer of credit are vital to economic development.' Al-
though accepting the essentials of this conclusion, recent research
by this author reveals the need to examine those political, institu-
tional, and ideological factors that have interfered with the for-
mulation of economically efficient commercial doctrines.2
Another author, who argues in a neo-Marxist vein, has focused
on the social costs resulting from the commercial law's support of
development. This author contends that before 1860, commer-
cial doctrines underwrote the rise of entrepreneurial classes at
the expense of vaguely defined noncapitalist classes. 3 The pur-
• Adjunct Professor of Law, Assistant Professor of History, University of Alabama.
B.A., San Diego State University, 1970; Ph.D., Indiana University, 1975. This Article was
made possible by a grant through the Regional Economic History Research Center at the
Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation, Wilmington, Delaware.
1 See J. HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW
(1955); 5 W. HOLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OFENGLISH LAW 60-154 (1924); 12 id. at 524-42; 8
id. at 99-300; J. HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-1970, at
38 (1973); Beutal, Colonial Sources of the Negotiable Instruments Law of the United
States, 34 ILL. L. REv. 136 (1939-40) [hereinafter cited as Colonial Sources]; Beutal, The
Development of State Statutes on Negotiable Paper Prior to the Negotiable Instruments
Law, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 836, 836-45 (1940) ]hereinafter cited as State Statutes]; Isaacs,
Business Postulates and the Law, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1014 (1928); Klein, The Development
of Mercantile Instruments of Credit in the United States, 12 J. Acr. 321, 321-45, 526-37,
594-607 (1911); Redich, The Promissory Note as a Financial & Business Instrument in the
Anglo-Saxon World: A Historical Sketch, in 3 REVUE INTERNATIONALE D'HISTOIRE DE LA
BANQUE 271 (1970).
This assumption suffused the voluminous work of Joseph Story. His views were
summarized in'J. STORY, Progress of Jurisprudence and Growth of the Commercial Law,
in THE MISCELLANEOUS WRriNGS OF JOSEPH STORY 199,263 (W. Story ed. Boston 1852).
2 See T. A. FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND BUSINESS IN
AMERIcAN HISTORY (1979) [hereinafter cited as FORUMS OF ORDER]; Freyer, Negotiable In-
struments and the Federal Courts In Antebellum American Business, 1976 Bus. HIST. REv.
435.
3 See M. HoRwiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 211-52
(1977).
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pose of this paper is to raise questions concerning whether either
efficiency or class provides the most fruitful analytical approach
to the study of the commercial law's function in the antebellum
economic order. The suggestion put forth is that, at least in the
case of rules controlling negotiable and accommodation paper,
the law often was not as supportive of economic growth as some
scholars have maintained. It also is suggested that intra-class
rather than inter-class conflict most accurately describes the na-
ture of debtor-creditor disputes prior to the Civil War.4
Fundamental to the commercial law's system of legally se-
cured rights was the principle of negotiability. 5 The law recog-
nized that certain kinds of commercial contracts-particularly
bills of exchange and promissory notes-were negotiable and
transferrable like money. The principle of negotiability did not
apply to ordinary contracts between two or more parties. As one
publication of this era observed, this principle was "an indul-
gence to commerce; it is a... compliment to the utility of a
credit system." 6 The "circulation" of "negotiable securities"
meant that "payments ... [could be] made without the carry-
ing of money... [and that] payments between the most distant
places [became] . . . easy, safe, and certain." 7 Because of the
value of negotiable instruments to the commercial system, "in
time... the common law.., placed their circulation on
grounds of security not otherwise afforded; and, honoring mer-
cantile good faith, made the [mere] possession of... [the instru-
ment] a sufficient protection [for recovery]."8
By 1800 the basic idea of negotiability was accepted through-
out the United States. 9 But during the nineteenth century there
4 This thesis grows out of research now in progress on the role of government in
early American capitalism.
5 See Isaacs, supra note 1, at 1024-25 for a discussion of the fundamental change the
concept of negotiability brought to the world of business.
6 Legal Protection of Good Faith, 1 HUNTS MERCHANTS' MAG. 230 (1839), quoted in
FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 5-8.
7 Id. See FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 1-18, 36-52 for a general discussion of
the same principle.
8 Legal Protection of Good Faith, supra note 6, quoted in FORUMS OF ORDER, supra
note 2, at 5-8.
9 For a discussion of the development of the law of negotiable instruments in Amer-
ica before and immediately after the Revolution, see Colonial Sources, supra note 1; State
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was much disagreement about how far the principle should be
applied instead of certain common-law doctrines that were in
varying degrees inimical to the negotiability principle. 10 The
common law had always restricted the right of one party to as-
sign his right to sue another. Even though a wide range of assign-
ments were allowed after 1800, the state laws were not in accord
on what sorts of assignments constituted transfers of negotiable
paper and what sorts were merely ordinary contracts between
two or more parties. 1
The problem of assignment was further complicated by the
doctrine of privity of contract. At common law, some promise or
consideration must pass between contracting parties before
either party acquires a right to sue the other. In transactions of
negotiable paper, however, disputes often were not between the
drawer and an original party to the contract, but instead in-
volved the rights of a subsequent endorsee. That is, the dispute
was not between A and B, but between A and C. Under the priv-
ity doctrine nothing passed between A and C, so C had no claim
against A. Actually, the usual case involved a fourth, fifth or still
later endorsee, but the question of whether privities should dis-
rupt the secured rights of a bona fide holder of commercial paper
directly challenged the principle of negotiability. 12
Related to the privity of contract issue was the more signif-
icant question of whether a subsequent endorsee could acquire a
better claim than the original parties to the contract had.s Under
a standard contract between A and B, A could set up a variety of
defenses if sued by B. Failure of consideration, fraud, payment,
insolvency, usury, and others were defenses that, if proved,
blocked B's claim. Under the principle of negotiability, however,
a bona fide holder of commercial paper, who received it in the
normal course of business for a valuable consideration and who
was innocent of any inequity associated with its original making
or transfer, possessed an absolute right of recovery "against all
Statutes, supra note 1, at 837-43. Onlyfive states had accepted theprinciple of full negoti-
abilityby 1800. M. HoRwnazsupra note3, at 215.
10 See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 3, at 215-16 for a discussion of resistance by state
courts to the negotiability principle.
11 Seeid.
12 Id. at 212-13; FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 37.
13 M. HOITwz, supra note 3, at 213.
1981-82]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the world." Thus, according to the principle of negotiability, the
law sanctioned the idea that the holder of a bill or note had a
more secure title than those who first entered into the contract.
4
Behind these technical considerations were two important
and interrelated issues of public policy. The first issue involved
the character of the antebellum money supply. A chronic scarcity
of capital and a confused currency plagued the nation's economy
prior to the Civil War. Commercial paper (including bank notes)
constituted during this time the bulk of the republic's medium of
exchange. '5 Disputes involving the status of the principle of nego-
tiability ultimately involved questions of how much credit would
be allowed as part of the circulating medium. Also implicit in the
problem was the issue of whether this medium of exchange
should be controlled by private market forces or the public au-
thority of government. Since neither state nor federal govern-
ment (especially after the demise of the Bank of the United
States) were eager to constrict the supply of money, the issue of
negotiability Was entwined with the influence of private market
transactions in the development of the antebellum economic or-
der.
A more subtle problem of currency and credit was the extent
to which legal rules might control exchanges once commercial in-
struments were held to be negotiable. The law could sanction
transfers of credit for purposes of paying off obligations, or it
could hold that such a transfer had been made in order to secure
further advances of credit. Simply stated, these two results seem
easily separated. In fact, however, because of the pervasive reli-
ance upon commercial contracts as a principal medium of ex-
change, and the extraordinary complexity of such contracts, it
was often quite difficult to determine whether a contract was
made for purposes of liquidating debt or in order to further ex-
tend credit.16 Something of the intricateness of such credit trans-
14 See d.
15 For a discussion of the relationship between the money supply and the negotiabil-
ity principle, see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 235-36 (1972); M. HoRWIvz,
supra note 3, at 218.
16 1 am indebted to Kilbourne, Antebellum Commercial Law: Civil Law Ap-
proaches to Secured Transactions, 70 KY. L.J. No. 3 (1981-82) for insight into the issue of
separating contracts made for purposes of paying off debts from those made for further ex-
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actions was suggested in a letter from Samuel Troth, a Philadel-
phia wholesaler, to a New York wholesale firm: "In case you
have drawn on me for the above amount [stated in the letter],
then please hand this check [also included with the letter] over to
the Brooklyn White Lead Co.... to be placed to my credit on
their books."'
17
Commercial transactions'such as Troth's were translated into
legal disputes over the principle of negotiability. A plethora of so-
cial and institutional factors inhibited an easy resolution of these
disputes. A salient feature of antebellum business was the mer-
chant's reliance on reputation and personal trust. Although the
predecessor of Dunn and Bradstreet began operation in 1841,
credit reporting was neither well received nor generally relied
upon until after the Civil War.18 This uncertain status of credit
reporting, combined with the relative slowness of communica-
tions, created problems with a system in which credit standing
depended almost entirely upon personal connections. The con-
tinuous threat and recurring reality of bankruptcy increased the
stresses upon the system. Finally, mercantile rivalry among trad-
ing centers generated suspicion, which further undermined de-
pendency upon an individual's reputation.' 9
A whole range of institutional factors also fostered uncertain-
ty in the legal rules governing commercial contracts. Merchants
often distrusted common law courts and juries because it was be-
lieved that they did not adequately understand the intricacies of
commercial transactions.20 For this reason mercantile interests
often favored equity tribunals. Even here, however, businessmen
found reason for complaint because legislatures regularly altered
equity's jurisdiction over commercial litigation. 2' But no doubt
the most important source of confusion was debtor-relief laws.
tending credit. See also Fletcher v. Morey, 9 F. Cas. 266 (C.D.D. Mass. 1843) (No.
4,864).
17 Letter from Samuel Troth to Grinnell Minturn & Co. (Apr. 21, 1843), quoted in
G. PORTER & H. LIVESAY, MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS 32 (1971).
18 Rather, the merchants of a particular trade would often cooperate among them-
selves to maintain a flow of credit information. See id. at 31-32, 74.
19 See generally FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 1-52.
20 Seeid. at40-41.
21 See id. at 20-22 for a discussion of American equity jurisdiction in the early 19th
century.
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Various business and other socio-economic groups favored such
laws from time to time, especially after economic panics. 2 The
frequency of change in these laws and their remarkable proce-
dural complexity, however, inhibited the fashioning of clear doc-
trines.23
Finally, ideological tensions between mercantile and agricul-
tural businessmen complicated the formulation of doctrines gov-
erning commercial contracts. A Georgian, one Benjamin F. Por-
ter, articulated this tension plainly: "We have had occasion, very
often of late," said Porter, "to observe with much concern, that a
deep-rooted prejudice is entertained by the agriculturalists
against the mercantile class. Among the former, indeed, is to be
found a general distrust of commercial men." The reasons for
this, Porter continued, were not hard to find. Merchants "are re-
garded as sharpers, whose lives are spent in acquiring a knowl-
edge of arts by which to deceive the producer;-as men who live
alone upon that class; -who exist not by labor, but by swindling
and ingenuity;-as drones of society, consuming the results of
the toil of others, and yielding nothing whatever to the commu-
nity in which they live."' 5
These and other factors shaped the law's uneven response to
accommodation loans, a particularly vital (and intricate) form of
commercial credit. Joseph Story explained accommodations in
his Commentaries on Bills of Exchange in 1843. A bill was
"often" drawn for the "mere private accommodation" of an en-
2 Following the panic of 1819, for example, Kentucky's newly elected General As-
sembly passed several bold statutes designed to protect debtors. Stay laws were passed
which denied creditors recovery on debts for up to 2 years after they became due. They
also made the generally depreciated notes of Kentucky banks the sole legal tender for pay-
ment of debts. See A. STICKLES, THE CarIcAL COURT STRUGGLE IN KFNrucKy, 1819-1829,
at 15-28 (1929).
23 A major reason for the great complexity of debtor-creditor laws from state-to-state
was that "[i]n general, states sought to discriminate against non-residents, especially out-
of-state creditors who had in-state debtors. State legislatures at times even went to such ex-
tremes as closing. the courts to prevent adjudication of debtor-creditor controver-
sies... [or] even passing private acts to overturn court decisions." FORUMS OF ORDER.
supra note 2, at 11.
24 Porter, Commerce and the PrejudiceAgainst It, 19 HUNTS MERCHANTS MAC. 392-
93 (1848). For a fuller discussion of the ideological dimensions see T. FREYER, HARMONY
AND DISSONANCE: THE SWIFn AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 143 (1981).
2 Porter, supra note 24, at 392-93.
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dorser "without receiving any value therefore," said Story.2 Or
the bill was accepted for the "mere accommodation and use" of
the maker or endorser "without having any funds of either on his
hands," or, he continued, on the "other hand the maker or en-
dorser ... often acts as a mere formal instrument, solely for the
benefit and accommodation of the.., acceptor."2 7 In the eyes
of the law, these accommodation contracts did not represent
bona fide transactions because no "valuable consideration'"
passed between parties. Because these contracts represented no
transfer of value, but were still used in bolstering a merchant's
credit standing, they posed legal problems. What were the rights
of a holder of a bill or note that was originally drawn as an ac-
commodation? Were they the same as those of a holder of a bill
drawn for a bona fide business transaction? Another complex
question involved accommodations and insolvency. What should
the law do if a bill or note, drawn as an accommodation, was en-
dorsed to a third person before or after the original drawer be-
came insolvent? Should the innocent third party be able to re-
cover on the contract?28
Legal commentators were unable to agree on such questions.
A digest of commercial doctrine controlling bills and notes gave
an explanation for diversity of decision in Pennsylvania. Grant-
ing legal protection to accommodation paper "might not suit the
extensive and complicated trade of a large commercial city, [but]
it is well adapted to the limited transactions of a country bank."29
Another explanation was rooted in a general distrust of credit
and "soft money" of all kinds. A critic writing in 1839 forcefully
stated this point of view: "CREDIT, CREDIT,-with very little
regard to the means of paying,-often ruinous to both parties, is
the fatal bane of commercial prosperity, of commercial honor
and honesty. The transactions of business are little more than fic-
tions."
26 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 17 (3d ed. Boston 1853).
27 Id. at 17-18.
28 See FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 9-10, 37-41.
2 A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF PENNsyLvANi... RELATIVE TO BANKS 129 (Harrisburg
1854).
30 Hopldnson, Lecture on Commercial Integrity, 1 HuNTs MERCHANTS' MAG. 375
(1839).
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The unsettled legal standing of accommodation loans was a
factor in disputes about the principle of negotiability. A signif-
icant instance of the connection between the two issues involved
bills or notes received in payment of pre-existing debts. Many
commercial contracts were drawn to pay debts that were due be-
cause of some previous transaction. In such cases, the contract
was not drawn to cover a new business deal, but solely to provide
payment for the pre-existing debt. Did such bills or notes meet
the requirements of negotiability? Were they received in the or-
dinary course of trade, and for valuable consideration? 31 Many
state courts acknowledged that the debt itself represented some-
thing of value, and that paper received in payment for pre-exist-
ing debts had been transferred in the regular course of business. 32
Other state courts refused to accept this rule, and some states in-
cluded cases upholding both views in their local law.33
Intricacies of business practice further complicated the ques-
tion of the negotiability of bills received in payment of pre-exist-
ing debts. It was common, as noted already, for businessmen to
make accommodation loans to those with whom they dealt, loans
31 FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 38.
32 See, e.g., Fenouille v. Hamilton, 35 Ala. 319 (1859); Bank of Mobile v. Hall, 6
Ala. 639 (1844); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Coe, 127 S.W. 453 (Ark. 1910); Bertrand v.
Barkman, 13 Ark. 150 (1852); Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388 (1836); Homes v. Smyth,
16 Me. 177 (1839); Rosmond v. Graham, 54 Minn. 323 (1893); Becker v. Sandusky City
Bank, 1 Minn. 311 (1856); Grantv. Kid vell, 30 Mo. 455 (1860); Goodmanv. Simonds, 19
Mo. 106 (1853); Cook v. Helms, 5 Wis. 107 (1856); Atchison v. Davidson, 2 Pin. 48 (Wis.
1847).
33 Compare Payne v. Cutler, 13 Wend. 605 (N.Y. 1834), Ontario Bank v. Worthing-
ton, 12 Wend. 593 (N.Y. 1834) and Rosa v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833)
with Bank of Sandusky v. Scoville, 24 Wend. 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840) and Bank of Salina
v. Babcock, 21 Wend. 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) for examples of conflicting cases in New
York. Compare Riley & Van Amringe v. Johnson, 8 Ohio 526 (1838) with Carlisle v. Wis-
hart, 11 Ohio 173 (1842) for oscillation on this point in Ohio.
Kent, in his COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 81-82 (13th ed. 1884), supported
the negotiability of bills received for antecedent debts and accommodations; but an anon-
ymous writer in HUNTS MERCHANTS" MAG. denied the negotiability of such commercial
contracts and said that this was the case in the majority of states. Legal Protection of Good
Faith, 1 HuNTs MEnCHANTs MAc. 231 (1839). A remarkable survey of the law in each
state in 1822 is found in 3 W. GRIFFIrh, ANNUAL LAW REGISTER OF THE UNrrED STATES 22,
24, 48, 78-79, 118, 142-43, 224-25, 227, 264, 268-69, 362, 365, 403-04,424, 445, 447, 468,
518-19, 521 (Burlington 1822); 4 id. at 587, 627-28, 670-71, 696-97, 796, 801, 864, 866,
943, 946, 1006, 1008, 1065, 1071, 1141, 1144, 1300. This work supports the view that
there was no agreement between the states on many aspects of negotiable instruments law.
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which were made solely to bolster the credit of the person receiv-
ing the loan. The merchants mutually understood that these ac-
commodation loans represented no real business transaction. A
common example of this was the frequent practice of banks and
merchants to extend the date of payment of a pre-existing debt
without collateral. An accommodation of this sort was made
through the use of a bill or note. The instrument would be given
as a security for the renewal of the debt, even though the paper
itself represented nothing of value. In other instances, however,
the paper represented a guarantee to pay the debt after its re-
newal at some future date.34
The practice of renewing due dates either through accommo-
dations or through real commercial transactions was extremely
common, and, because of their widespread use and their close
similarity to instruments simply received in payment of pre-exist-
ing debts, judges had great difficulty in separating bona fide
transactions from accommodations. Because of these complica-
tions, many courts in the United States refused to extend the
principle of negotiability to any paper involving pre-existing
debts. Other courts, however, seeking as broad a circulation of
commercial paper as possible, upheld the opposite rule. And
again, some states included both doctrines in their local law. 5
Accommodations affected the status of negotiability in other
ways. As noted earlier, accommodation paper was often en-
dorsed to third parties who had no knowledge of the conditions
of the original loan agreement. In such cases, determining the
status of these innocent subsequent endorsees was not only cru-
cial to their interests alone, but was also important to the general
principle of negotiability. If subsequent endorsees were left un-
certain about recovery on a bill or note because it might have in-
volved an accommodation, they might increasingly become wary
of endorsing any commercial paper since it was virtually impossi-
ble at times to distinguish between "real" transactions and unse-
cured loans. As with the confusion surrounding pre-existing
debts, such an outcome would limit the transferability and circu-
34 FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 38. See also J. STORY, supra note 1, at 17.
35 FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 38. See notes 29 and 30 supra for cases and au-
thorities illustrating these conflicts.
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lation of negotiable instruments.36
This problem was exacerbated because of business practices
that used accommodations for purposes that were either fraud-
ulent or verged on fraud. In many cases. courts wrestled with the
question of whether an innocent subsequent endorsee of such
paper possessed an absolute right of recovery, even though the
original parties to the contract had no collateral themselves. This
was an extremely difficult problem, one in which there was a
complete lack of agreement from state to state. Under the old
common law, adhered to by some states, the innocent subsequent
endorsee had no bona fide right in such cases, whereas, under
other principles of mercantile law his right of recovery was abso-
lute. Some states followed the mercantile rule, while others had
precedents upholding both doctrines.37 Failure to establish clear
rules on this subject served to retard the formulation of a uniform
principle of negotiability throughout the nation.-,
Conditions in commercially important New York reflected
the status of the commercial law in many states. Jurisdictional
disputes between equity and common law courts, which led to
periodic restructuring of the judicial system between 1816 and
1839, no doubt contributed to a lack of clarity in the law con-
cerning the negotiability of bills received in payment of pre-
existing debts. In 1821 in Bay v. Coddington, James Kent,
Chancellor of New York's equity jurisdiction, refused to extend
the negotiability principle to certain forms of commercial accom-
modations involving fraud. In doing so, however, he did in-
directly admit that bills received in payment of pre-existing debts
were negotiable. 40
Perhaps because of Kent's oblique recognition of pre-existing
debts having value, later New York judges in the common-law
courts misread Bay v. Coddington and decided that bills held for
antecedent debts did not guarantee their holders an absolute
right of recovery. In 1837, the reporter of the New York decision
38 FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 38-39.
37 FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2., at 39.
3 See notes 25-26 supra for authorities illustrating the lack of a uniform principle of
negotiability.
315 Johns. Ch. 54, afJ'd, 20 Johns. Rep. 637 (N.Y. 1822).4 0 Id. at 56-57. See also Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. Ch. 239 (N.Y. Ch. 1810).
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Smith v. Van Loan4' (which followed a true reading of Kent's de-
cision), acknowledged that the question was unsettled but noted
that the "weight of authority favored affording the rights of a
bona fide holder to those holding bills received for pre-existing
debts." 42 Soon the New York Supreme Court upheld the same
principle in two banking cases. 43 The doctrine remained in dis-
pute, however, until the twentieth century.44
Federal courts also dealt with the issues of pre-existing debt
and accommodation paper. In the famous case of Swift v. Ty-
son,4 the technical question involved the negotiability of a bill
received in payment of a pre-existing debt, which was colored
with possible frauds in its original making. Upholding the princi-
ple of negotiability. Justice Story, writing for a unanimous
Court, declared that "general commercial law" governed such
questions. 46 Later scholarship concerning this controversial prin-
ciple has obscured the extent to which Swift was essentially a
commercial law decision involving the security of certain forms
of mercantile credit. Although the point had not been argued by
counsel, Story introduced into his opinion the rule that bills re-
ceived as collateral securities for previous loans were negotiable
(like those received in payment of actual antecedent debts) .47
This extension of the negotiability principle to a form of accom-
modation paper was a novel enough judgment that it was re-
sisted by Justice John Catron in a concurring opinion (he did not,
however, disagree with the rest of the Story opinion).48
In the years to come, the Swift decision had a mixed impact
on the nation's commercial law. Ohio,49 New Jersey,5° North
41 16 Wend. 659 (N.Y. 1837).
42 Id. at 59 n.a.
43 Bank of Salina v. Babcock, 21 Wend. 499; Bank of Sandusky v. Scovill, 24 Wend.
115.
44 See Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA.
L. REV. 869, 881-83 n.23 (1930-31).
45 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 53-98 and T.
FREYER, supra note 22, at 1-100 for in-depth and revisionist treatments of the Swift case.
46 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
47 Id. at 19-20. See note 55 infra for cases rejecting this dicta.
48 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 23 (Catron, J., concurring).
49 Carlislev. Wishart, 11 Ohio at 191-92.
o Allaire v. Harshorne, 21 N.J.L. 665 (1847).
1981-821]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNALo.
Carolina, 5' Michigan, 52 AlabamaO and other states.4 accepted
Story's opinion insofar as it applied to pre-existing debts; these
states did not, however, generally accept the extension of negoti-
ability to include collateral securities.-, New York, in the well-
known decision of Stalker v. McDonald was the only state to
flatly deny the validity of Swift. Ironically, James Kent disap-
proved of this case, asserting that Story's decision established the
"plainer and better doctrine."57 By the 1850's, legal commenta-
tors proclaimed Swift as a "leading commercial case."5, In fed-
eral courts it was used (and abused) to establish a fairly uniform
body of commercial rules. But because in most instances federal
judges could not control state courts, the impact of the Swift doc-
trine on local law was, at least until the end of the century, prob-
lematic."
Applying the Swift doctrine, federal judges probably aided
those business interests who came within the federal courts' juris-
diction (particularly wholesalers engaged in interstate trade).
But throughout the antebellum era most commercial activity was
either local or regional, and most of the disputes arising from
such activity were governed by local law. In many cases-as
with rules governing negotiability and accommodation in New
York-this law was not settled. Various social, institutional, and
ideological factors often undermined the formulation of clear
principles controlling commercial obligations. The unsettled
state of local law and the force of factors contributing to this con-
dition, cast doubt on the validity of characterizing the law's
function in economic development as entirely supportive. This
51 Reddickv. Jones, 28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 86 (1845).
52 Bostwick v. Dodge, 1 Doug. 413 (Mich. 1844).
53 Bank of Mobile v. Hall, 6 Ala. 639.
54 See Bertrand v. Barkman, 13 Ark. 150; Blanchard v. Stevens, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.)
162 (1849); Stevenson v. Heyland, 11 Minn. 198 (1866); Atchison v. Davidson, 2 Pin. 48.
"5 Bank of Mobile v. Hall, 6 Ala. at 645-46; Roxborough v. Messick, 6 Ohio St. 676
(1856); Cook v. Helms, 5 Wis. 107. See Bramhall v. Beckett, 31 Me. 205 (1850).
56 6Hill 93 (N.Y. 1843).
57 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 81 n.b. (13th ed. 1884).
5 See 1 AMERICAN LEADING CASES 344 (J. Hare & H. Wallace ed. Philadelphia
1851); T. PARSONS, THE ELEMENTS OF MERCANTILE LAW 151 (2d ed. Boston 1862). See also
T. FREYER, supra note 22, at 46-47.
59 T. FREYER, supra note 22, at 45-100 for an analysis of the effect of Swift.
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suggests that, at least in the crucial area of legally secured credit,
the law's impact on development was more equivocal than often
thought. ®
If this conclusion is accurate it raises troubling questions con-
cerning the exact role of the commercial law in the development
of the antebellum economic order. More specifically, the view
that law often did not facilitate economic development raises is-
sues of the impact of legal rules on the character of the money
supply, the proper characterization of debts as liquidated or
merely extended, and the relationship between law and class.. No
attempt can be made here to deal with such issues in depth. It
may be possible, however, to outline an approach through the
use of manuscript legal records that might eventually place these
problems in a new light.61
Debtor-creditor litigation at the trial level, insolvency case
files, and a record of those jailed for debt provides a rather con-
crete impression of winners and losers and what was at stake in
commercial disputes arising prior to the Civil War. A sheriff's
"Goal Calendar" for West Chester Pennsylvania revealed valu-
able information about seventy-nine individuals incarcerated be-
cause of failure to pay their debts during 1813-1816. This record
suggested something of the character of debt in a typical local
commercial center. Persons were imprisoned for debts ranging
from sixty-two and one-half cents to seventy dollars. The average
debt was $17.00, but nearly half of these debts were $8.00 or less.
The average length of incarceration was ten days, but nearly half
of those jailed were released after one to five days. One man es-
caped and thirteen others were granted their freedom under pro-
visions of the state's insolvency law. The rest of those imprisoned,
however, left jail after their debts were paid by themselves, a
business associate or family relative, or because their creditors
provided for release (presumably because the debt was paid) .62
6o Evidence supporting this argument is developed in Freyer, Eminent Domain,
Localism, and Economic Development in Antebellum America, REGIONAL ECONOMIC
HISTORY RESEARCH CENTER WORKING PAPERS 1-32 (1980).
6' The following manuicript material is a small sample of extensive research carried
on while in residence at the Regional Economic History Research Center, Eleutherian
Mills-Hagley Foundation, Wilmington, Delaware during 1979 as a Postdoctoral Fellow.
62 
COAL CALENDAR, SHERIFF, WEST CHESTER COUNTY, 1813-1816 (presently located
in West Chester Historical Society).
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The case files of insolvents in the federal district courts of the
District of Columbia and Maryland from 1800 to 1850 provide
further relative information about debtors. Although the amount
of debt was greater than that of the West Chester group, there
was a similar pattern in that relatively small debts made up the
total. A merchant's total indebtedness was $15,908, but the indi-
vidual amounts ranged from $20.00 to $700.00. More typical
were the debts of: a shipbuilder whose debts ran from $42.00 to
$250.00, totaling $3,475; an actor whose average debt was
$5.00, totaling $683.00; and a contractor "on the public works"
whose debts ranged between $5.00 and $50.00, totaling $496.00.
A shoe salesman, several blacksmiths, and clerks, and a dealer in
china, glass, and Queen's ware were further representative of
these insolvents and the character of their debts.6
From this evidence emerges the profile of a typical debtor-
creditor relationship. The average businessman's capital was
composed of an aggregate of relatively small loans spread around
numerous creditors. Usually, each creditor was, in turn, the
debtor of someone else. This entwining of many relatively mod-
est debts and credits made it rather difficult to determine whe-
ther at any given point in time a businessman was solvent. The
short duration of imprisonments for debt in West Chester sug-
gested that businessmen often went to jail, to, in effect, extend
the length of time they had to cover their obligations. The fre-
quency with which friends, relatives and even one's creditors re-
leased jailed debtors suggested that the overlapping network of
debts and credits reduced the short-term risk of temporary non-
payment. Of course, in the long run the system was fragile, but
such a disadvantage was balanced by the extent to which the sys-
tem also gave enterprising individuals the means to start business
at a relatively low cost. Thus, while a businessman of small
means might fail several times, he could eventually establish a
stable enterprise.
The unstable and shifting status of debtors and creditors in-
fluenced whether class conflict was an integral part of commer-
6 The examples given here result from the author's survey of manuscript records of
R621, Maryland Federal Circuit Court, equity and civil case files, Federal District Court
for the District of Maryland Bankruptcy Records, and Federal District Court, District of
Columbia, Bankruptcy Records, for the period 1800-1850.
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cial credit relationships. As the evidence presented here shows,
insolvency was a fact of life for both large and small business-
men. Because the pattern of debt was similar for most business-
men, virtually everyone was vulnerable to risks of failure. Given
such an economic order, it may be said that debtor-creditor dis-
putes involved intra-class rather than inter-class confrontation.
At stake in these disputes was not a dominant class's control of
another weaker class's resources. The issue instead concerned the
distribution of scarce financial resources among competing inter-
ests belonging to roughly the same class. 4
What impact did the rules governing negotiability and ac-
commodation have on this business order? Extending the prin-
ciple of negotiability to bills received in payment of pre-existing
debts and as collateral securities gave creditors a stronger legal
position than they would have had had their obligations been
regulated by privity or other common-law doctrines. In an econ-
omy in which negotiable paper provided a large portion of the
circulating medium of exchange, an increase in secured credit
helped enlarge the money supply. The broadening of negotiabil-
ity to include accommodations and pre-existing debts also pro-
vided incentives to use credit as a basis for further advances of
credit rather than merely for the paying off of accounts. The
overall impact of commercial law doctrines was to supply large
and small businessmen, in both agriculture and commerce, with
the means to develop their enterprise. 5
However, the extent to which law functions solely in support
of economic development was clouded in ambiguity. The federal
courts (especially after Swift) did fashion a fairly uniform doc-
trine favoring negotiability and accommodation. This uniform-
ity, however, extended only to cases coming within federal juris-
diction. The local law of the states completely lacked consistency
of principle in rules controlling debtor-creditor obligations. After
1842, several states followed Swift by extending the principle of
negotiability to include bills received for pre-existing debts;6 but
0' See note 60 supra for a citation to an article containing corroborative evidence on
this point.
6 See generally C. GILBERT & H. KROUSS, AMERICAN BUSINESS HISTORY 112-13
(1972); G. PORTER & H. LIVEsAY, supra note 17, at 29-34; Hammond, Long and Short
Term Credit in Early American Banking, 49 Q.J. ECON. 87-95 (1934-35).
6 See notes 49-54 supra for the relevant cases from these states.
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these states generally did not extend the principle to include col-
lateral securities and certain kinds of accommodation paper. 7 A
few states, such as New York, rejected altogether efforts to estab-
lish a uniformity of commercial doctrine. 8 Moreover, this pat-
tern of diversity of law from state to state further created barriers
increasing the cost of business. Behind these uncertainties were
social, institutional, and ideological factors that deterred the
kind of unrestrained development so often associated with the
antebellum American economy.6
This ambiguous impact of law on the economy suggested
that the nation's acceptance of industrialization was more grad-
ual than scholars have often maintained. A focus upon the grad-
ualness of the law's response to a changing business order also re-
veals problems with an analysis based primarily on class. Manu-
script legal records show that debtor-creditor disputes usually in-
volved intra-class rather than inter-class confrontation. 70 These
considerations support Roscoe Pound's observation that the "ef-
fect of economic change" upon law "is for the most part gradual
and slow, no matter what class is affected." 71 This meant, Pound
concluded, that entrepreneurial interests often have had as much
to complain of for their treatment under the law as they had to
welcome.72 The evidence presented here suggests a need for test-
ing Pound's thesis in a more thorough study of antebellum com-
mercial law.
67 See note 55 supra for the relevant cases.
68 See the text accompanying notes 56-57 supra for a discussion of New York's rejec-
tion of Swift in Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93.
69 See FORUMS OF ORDER, supra note 2, at 19-35; T. FREYER, supra note 24, at 1-100
for background on these factors.
70 See the text accompanying notes 4 and 65 supra for further elaboration on this
point.
71 Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts, 53 HARV. L. REV.
365, 367 (1940). I am indebted to William Hurst for this reference.
72 See id. at 365-85. See also T. COCHRAN, BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE: A HISTORY
195 (1972); 1 F. REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS 43-48,
57, 126, 135, 139, 142 (1968); 2id. at 34, 38, 39, 116.
[Vol. 70
